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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
STATE CLEAN ENERGY LEGISLATION
Kevin Todd*
ABSTRACT
This Note analyzes recent litigation concerning the constitutionality of state renewable
portfolio standards (RPSs) and similar environmental legislation designed to promote
clean energy. It begins with a discussion of the current state of both federal and state
responses to climate change. From there, it analyzes several legal challenges to state RPSs
and other climate-related laws that focus on potential violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause. It concludes with a brief exploration of how these cases fit the history
and purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Note argues that a narrow view of
the doctrine is consistent with the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause, will reaffirm
principles of federalism, will enable state innovation in the renewable energy field, and
will make a positive contribution to efforts to mitigate climate change. By structuring
statutes so as to draw a court’s attention to the ways in which their legislation fits within
the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause, states can give themselves more space to
take aggressive action to promote clean energy and reduce the impacts of climate change.
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Seemingly every week, a new report or event highlights the severity of the
slow-rolling climate crisis. In November 2018, thirteen federal agencies issued a
report estimating that climate change will reduce economic growth in the United
1
States by ten percent by the turn of the century. Scientists have presented strong
evidence that weather extremes such as the severe cold of the “polar vortex,” record
heat waves across the globe, and extended droughts in California and Australia are
2
connected to our changing climate. An October 2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that limiting warming to two
degrees Celsius, long a political target of the United Nations (UN), will likely not
3
be enough to ward off many catastrophic impacts of climate change.
These warnings and real-life impacts stand in stark contrast to the blasé attitude of the federal government toward mitigating the impacts of climate change.
Since taking office, President Trump has taken steps to pull the United States out
of the Paris climate agreement, rolled back the Clean Power Plan, and moved to
prop up struggling coal plants despite their contributions to air pollution and flag4
ging ability to compete in the energy marketplace. While the federal government
was more environmentally friendly prior to 2017, critics have argued that even the
5
Obama Administration did not do enough to make the climate a priority.
The shortcomings of the Obama Administration in combating climate change,
like the climate negligence of the Trump Administration, highlight the need for

1.
See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, FOURTH NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT:
SUMMARY FINDINGS (2018), at 26, https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch01_
Summary-Findings.pdf; Coral Davenport & Kendra Pierre-Louis, U.S. Climate Report Warns of Damaged Environment and Shrinking Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/23/climate/us-climate-report.html?module=inline.
2.
Somini Sengupta, U.S. Midwest Freezes, Australia Burns: This is the Age of Weather Extremes,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/climate/global-warming-extremeweather.html.
3.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS
O
IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 C APPROVED BY GOVERNMENTS,
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-onglobal-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments (finding that 2 degrees warming would dramatically
increase the chances of an ice-free Artic and lead to significantly higher sea levels relative to 1.5 degrees
of warming).
OF

4.
Timmons Roberts, One Year Since Trump’s Withdrawal From the Paris Climate Agreement,
BROOKINGS: PLANETPOLICY (June 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/
one-year-since-trumps-withdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/; Jeff Brady, Trump’s EPA Plans to
Ease Carbon Emissions Rules for New Coal Plants, NPR (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
2018/12/06/674255402/trumps-epa-plans-to-ease-carbon-emissions-rule-for-new-coal-plants.
5.
See, e.g., David Bookbinder, Obama Had a Chance to Really Fight Climate Change. He Blew It.,
VOX (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/28/15472508/obama-climate-changelegacy-overrated-clean-power; Marianne Lavelle, Obama’s Climate Legacy Marked by Triumphs and Lost
Opportunities, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 26, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/23122016/
obama-climate-change-legacy-trump-policies.
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robust state level action to tackle the issue. Without new legislation, even a President motivated to address climate change will be left attempting to shoehorn climate policy into the Clean Air Act (CAA) and other existing environmental laws.
The fate of President Obama’s signature climate initiative, the Clean Power Plan,
highlights the limits on Executive authority to address climate change under existing legislation. Even before President Trump was elected, the Supreme Court
placed a stay on the Plan—which the Obama Administration argued was author6
7
ized by the CAA, pending judicial review. This move signaled the Court’s apparent concern that the Clean Power Plan went beyond Congress’s grant of statutory
8
authority.
Given a narrow judicial view of existing Executive authority in the climate
9
space, a new President could be left to take only modest administrative steps
10
while advocating for major new legislation such as the Green New Deal. Such
11
legislation is certainly possible, but any bill would have a steep hill to overcome,
particularly if skepticism of climate change continues to be a prominent position
12
among Republican legislators. Among Democratic legislators, less debate exists
on the existence of climate change, but support for aggressive new legislation varies
13
widely among the party’s elected officials.
6.
(2015).

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662

7.
Order in Pending Case, Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 577 U.S. __ (2016) (granting a stay
pending review of the Clean Power Plan).
8.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH.
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/?utm_term=
.67eb46aa599d (noting that although the stay order was short and gave no reasoning, it “suggests that a
majority of the court has concerns about the EPA’s authority to impose the CPP under the Clean Air
Act”).
9.

See id.

10.
Green New Deal, NEW CONSENSUS, https://newconsensus.com/green-new-deal/ (last visited
June 14, 2019) (describing the Green New Deal as “a World War II-scale mobilization” designed to
“achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions”).
11.
See Congress Climate History, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climate-history/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2018).
12.
See Mark K. Matthews, Inside Conservatives’ Disarray on Climate, E&E NEWS (Apr. 15,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060162805 (describing the ongoing debate among conservatives
as to the existence of climate change, and highlighting Republican resistance as a key obstacle in passing
any climate legislation).
13.
See Mark K. Matthews, In GOP Senate, a Rare Climate Hearing and Hints of More, E&E
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2019/03/06/stories/1060123255 (quoting
Democratic Senator Joe Manchin as acknowledging the existence of climate change, but saying that
solutions “[require] the recognition that fossil fuels aren’t going anywhere anytime soon”). See also
Rashaan Ayesh, Where the 2020 Presidential Candidates Stand on the Green New Deal, AXIOS (last updated
May 23, 2019), https://www.axios.com/2020-presidential-candidates-green-new-deal-22faff60-3fee45f3-8636-09e437c82431.html (highlighting statements from six Democratic presidential candidates
who are cosponsors of the Green New Deal in the Senate).
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In the absence of significant federal action, several states have taken the lead
on advancing US climate policy. California, in particular, has taken significant
steps to reduce its carbon pollution. The state first set greenhouse gas (GHG)
14
emissions standards for motor vehicles in 2002. California has since committed to
reduce GHG emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, and has implemented a
Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) designed to reduce life cycle emissions of fuels
15
consumed in state. However, the state is far from alone in advancing a positive
climate agenda. Nine northeastern states have created a cap and trade market, the
16
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Numerous governors and local
leaders across the country have pledged that their state or city will still work to
17
meet the targets of the Paris climate agreement. In all, current policies adopted
by cities, states, and businesses are projected to reduce total US emissions to 17%
18
below 2005 levels by 2025.
One key policy adopted by many states is the Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS). As of Spring 2019, twenty nine states and Washington D.C. had adopted a
19
mandatory RPS. Under these policies, states mandate that a set percentage of the
20
electricity sold by in-state utilities comes from renewable sources. RPSs have
been a driver of growth in the U.S. renewable energy market, particularly in the
21
first decade of the 21st century. As states continue to raise the percentage of en-

14.
Vicki Arroyo, State and Local Climate Leadership in the Trumpocene, 2017 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 303, 304 (2017).
15.
Id.; Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/
fuels/lcfs/lcfs.htm (last reviewed July 18, 2019) (Life cycle emissions are calculated by examining the
“greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production, transportation, and use of a given fuel. The
life cycle assessment includes direct emissions associated with producing, transporting, and using the
fuels, as well as significant indirect effects on greenhouse gas emissions, such as changes in land use for
some biofuels.”).
16.

Arroyo, supra note 14.

17.
Id. at 305-06. See also Who’s In, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/signatories
(last visited Aug. 12, 2019) (listing 10 states and 287 cities and counties among over 2,800 entities
around the country that have pledged to continue working toward the goals laid out in the Paris
Agreement).
18.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, ET AL., FULFILLING AMERICA’S PLEDGE: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 5 (2018), https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2018/09/Fulfilling-Americas-Pledge_
Executive-Summary_2018.pdf.
19.
See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Feb. 1, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx (including a
map showing every state with an RPS).
20.
Project Overview, STATE POWER PROJECT, https://statepowerproject.org/ (last visited June
16, 2019).
21.
GALEN BARBOSE, U.S. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: 2017 ANNUAL STATUS
REPORT 12 (July 2017) (showing that from 2000 until roughly 2007 nationwide renewable energy
growth tightly tracked RPS requirements); see also Herman K. Trabish, Modernizing Renewables Mandates is No Longer About the Megawatts, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/modernizing-renewables-mandates-is-no-longer-about-the-megawatts/529895/.
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ergy that must come from renewable sources—Hawaii and Washington have set
22
the goal of obtaining 100% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2045 —
RPSs are likely to continue playing a vital role in driving energy innovation.
Alongside their admirable environmental goals, state legislatures also frequently hope to “wring economic development benefits” from RPSs by bolstering
23
their local renewable energy industry. States have typically sought to capture this
localized benefit in a handful of ways. In some instances, policymakers argue that
increased local investment may naturally be expected to flow into the state as a re24
sult of a firm commitment to green energy. Sometimes however, as will be discussed further in Section II, policymakers’ attempts to capture economic benefit
through an RPS may impermissibly discriminate against out-of-state commerce. A
state legislature’s presumed or actual intent to capture economic development benefits through such discrimination has led to constitutional challenges under the
25
dormant Commerce Clause.
Across a series of cases, constitutional challenges to state RPSs have generally
had the same thrust—allegations that an RPS, either through facial operation or
practical effect, serves a primarily protectionist function. To date, these challenges
have focused on one of two arguments. First, that the program is designed in such
a way as to effectively regulate commerce that takes place entirely outside of the
26
state. Second, that the RPS is structured to capture the local or regional economic benefits of renewable energy development while shielding local industry from
27
outside competition. While the elimination of an RPS is likely to primarily bene28
fit traditional energy interests, court battles have not been limited to fossil fuel
companies suing states as they attempt to go green. In some instances, out-of-state
renewable energy companies have argued that states are attempting to limit com29
petition to local producers.

22.
Securing the Renewable Future, HAW. ST. ENERGY OFF., http://energy.hawaii.gov/
renewable-energy (last visited Dec. 9, 2018); Catherine Morehouse, Inslee Signs 100% Clean Energy Bill
in Midst of 2020 White House Bid, UTILITY DIVE (May 8, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
washington-100-clean-energy-law-only-a-signature-from-inslee-away/552627/.
23.
Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation, 31 ENERGY J. 133, 135 (2010).
24.
TRAVIS MADSEN ET AL., ENV’T MICH. RESEARCH & POLICY CTR., ENERGIZING
MICHIGAN’S ECONOMY 43-44 (Feb. 2007) (arguing that increased energy investment will flow into
Michigan should the state adopt an RPS).
25.

See infra Section II.

26.

See infra Section II.A.

27.

See infra Section II.B.

28.
See Lyon & Yin, supra note 23, at 140 (“Fossil-fuel based electricity generation and fossil
fuel producers stand to lose from an RPS.”). See also KAREN PALMER & DALLAS B URTRAW,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES 2 (Jan.
2005) (“The RPS tends to encourage renewables largely at the expense of natural gas.”).
29.
See infra Section II.B for a discussion of the case Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, in which out-of-state
renewable energy producers sued Connecticut over the structure of its RPS.
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The remainder of this Note is broken into three sections. Section I will provide a brief overview of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the current
debates over its scope. This analysis demonstrates that the judiciary has become
increasingly skeptical of a broad dormant Commerce Clause in recent years. Section II will analyze a series of dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state RPS.
This portion shows that most constitutional challenges to RPS-like laws have
failed, while also examining why a Minnesota clean energy statute was struck
down. Section III will explore the merits of the approach to the dormant Commerce Clause advanced by each circuit, and extract lessons for how state RPSs
could be drafted to withstand a constitutional challenge. This section argues that
the judiciary has largely demonstrated an intent to limit the scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause, which will enable states to move aggressively in the promotion
of renewable energy.

I. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE OVERVIEW
The dormant Commerce Clause is an implied extension of the Commerce
30
Clause with “deep roots” in American jurisprudence. While its application has
varied somewhat over time, the general thrust of the doctrine is perhaps best
summed up as a prohibition on “discriminat[ion] between transactions on the basis
31
of some interstate element.” The modern Court has identified three broad
strands of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
First, the Court subjects any law that facially discriminates against out-ofstate commerce to strict scrutiny, which has been described in practice as virtually
32
a per se bar. In order for a state law that facially discriminates against out-of-state
commerce to be upheld, it must be “demonstrably justified by a valid factor unre33
lated to economic protectionism.” Second, if a law’s burden on interstate commerce is only incidental, it is subject to review under a more lenient balancing test.
34
Often called “Pike balancing,” laws are only struck down under this standard if
the burden on interstate commerce substantially outweighs the local benefit of the
35
law. Third, the Court has occasionally struck down statutes when they act to reg-

30.
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852); and Case of the State Freight
Tax, 82 U.S. 232 (1873) as foundational cases in the development of the dormant Commerce Clause).
31.

Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 n.12 (1977).

32.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (describing a “virtually per
se rule of invalidity” for state legislation clearly motivated by economic protectionism).
33.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131
(1986) for an example of a statute that was upheld despite facial discrimination against out-of-state
commerce.
34.

See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970).

35.

See, e.g., Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 71 (3d Cir. 2014).

_JCI_TODD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/25/2020 4:15 PM

State Clean Energy Legislation

Fall 2019]

195

ulate transactions taking place entirely outside the state.36 Under this “extraterritoriality doctrine,” the key question is whether the statute has the “practical effect”
37
of controlling conduct “beyond the boundaries of the state.” As described below,
RPSs or similar statutes have been challenged under each of these three prongs of
38
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The only successful suit to date has
39
relied on the extraterritoriality doctrine.
While these three strands of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence are
well established, there is an ongoing debate about whether the provision exists at
40
all. The Court has slowly narrowed the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause
41
over the past several decades. Justices Scalia and Thomas have gone further still,
arguing both that the dormant—or negative—Commerce Clause lacks a foundation
in the text of the Constitution, and that the Court’s application of the doctrine is
42
hopelessly confused. During his tenure as a circuit judge, Justice Gorsuch suggested potential agreement with Justices Thomas and Scalia’s critiques. In a key
case, Gorsuch cited to their criticisms of the dormant Commerce Clause before
concluding that, “as an inferior court we take Supreme Court precedent as we find
43
it.” As a member of the Supreme Court, he may be unlikely to apply strict
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to state laws. While many of the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause opinions are fractured, reflecting a diverse array of
views on the doctrine, at least six Justices on the current Court have affirmed the
44
clause’s existence. The debate over the existence and scope of the dormant

36.
See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (striking down a New York law for
“establish[ing] a wage scale or a scale of prices for use in other states”).
37.

Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).

38.

See infra Section II.

39.

See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016).

40.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L. J. 569, 569 (1987) (arguing that the Constitution provides
“no textual basis for” the exercise of the dormant Commerce Clause, and that the doctrine undermines
the balance of federalism embodied in the text).
41.
See Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENVER L. REV. 255,
255 (2017).
42.
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The fundamental problem with our negative Commerce Clause cases is that the Constitution does not contain a negative Commerce Clause.”); Hillside Dairy v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in
the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application.”).
43.

Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (2015).

44.
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (In this case, four dissenters—Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—voted to strike down a
state law under the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Alito, Thomas and Gorsuch analyzed the statute under the dormant Commerce Clause before concluding that the law did not run afoul of the Constitution. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each
concurred. Justice Thomas reasserted his disagreement with the Court’s entire dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence despite believing the majority reached the right outcome in this case, while Justice
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Commerce Clause will be a key one to watch if a case involving an RPS or similar
state-level clean energy law makes its way to the Court.

II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO STATE
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
State RPSs and other similar state-level environmental statutes have been
45
challenged on dormant Commerce Clause grounds in several jurisdictions. Typically, plaintiffs have been out-of-state fossil fuel companies alleging that, under the
new policy, they are unable to sell their goods into the state on a level playing
46
field. In at least one instance the policy was challenged by an out of state renew47
able energy producer. This indicates that the policy divide does not always cut
cleanly across green energy/fossil fuel lines. To date, four federal circuits have
48
ruled on a state RPS or similar policy and a fifth, the Seventh Circuit, has
49
weighed in.
In Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, Judge Posner addressed the constitu50
tionality of Michigan’s RPS in a line of dicta. Writing for a Seventh Circuit panel on a case involving transmission line financing, Posner briefly noted that in his
view, “Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the
51
Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.” Although this
opinion only briefly touched on Michigan’s RPS, it was still a notable moment in
the development of RPS litigation. Judge Posner’s opinion led to a surge in activity and speculation about the future of state clean energy standards among envi52
ronmental and energy lawyers.

Gorsuch wrote to note that his joining the opinion did not signal support for the Court’s history of
dormant Commerce Clause case law).
45.

See infra Sections II.A & II.B.

46.
See, e.g., Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1077 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting
that many Energy & Environment Legal Institute members are “out-of-state coal producers”); Rocky
Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) (showing that one plaintiff challenging California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard was the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers
Association); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 899 (D. Minn. 2014) (naming plaintiffs
including the Industrial Commission of North Dakota, the Lignite Energy Council, and North American Coal Corporation).
47.

Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2017).

48.
See infra Sections II.A & II.B (discussing recent cases from the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth circuits).
49.

See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013).

50.

See id.

51.

Id. at 776.

52.
E.g., Justin Graham, Judge Posner Suggests Some Renewable Portfolio Standards are Unconstitutional, THE ENERGY & NAT. RES. BLOG (July 3, 2013) https://blog.lrrc.com/energy/2013/07/03/judgeposner-suggests-some-renewable-portfolio-standards-are-unconstitutional/; Hannah Northey & Jeremy
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Judge Posner’s opinion has since been followed by a series of RPS cases across
the country. The first opinion to rule directly on the constitutionality of an RPS
53
was authored by then-Judge Gorsuch in the Tenth Circuit. Plaintiffs in that case,
the Energy and Environment Legal Institute (EELI), argued that Colorado’s RPS
54
violated the extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause. The
three judge panel unanimously upheld Colorado’s law, finding that EELI had offered no explanation for how out-of-state fossil-fuel producers would be hurt worse
55
than in-state fossil fuel producers. EELI’s extraterritoriality argument hinged on
the idea that Colorado’s RPS places an improper control on how out-of-state ener56
gy may be generated. Both the district court and appellate courts dismissed this
theory out of hand. The district court found that even under the plaintiff’s telling,
the statute only limited out-of-state producers in their transactions with in-state
57
Colorado utilities. This type of interaction is, by definition, not wholly out of
58
state.
At the appellate level, Judge Gorsuch did not revisit this particular finding of
the district court. He did, however, take the opportunity to advance a narrow reading of the extraterritoriality doctrine that could prove influential in future RPS
cases. Describing extraterritoriality as “the most dormant doctrine in dormant
59
commerce clause jurisprudence,” Judge Gorsuch wrote that extraterritoriality is
properly applied—to the extent that it is a valid doctrine at all—only in the context
60
of direct price control statutes. The opinion contrasted such direct regulation of
prices with more typical state regulation of product safety, quality, or health, which
61
should be reviewed under the more relaxed Pike balancing test. As will be discussed further below, if this narrow view of extraterritoriality prevails nationwide,
states will have much more flexibility to adopt environmental statutes such as
RPSs. A more robust view of extraterritoriality by contrast would endanger not
only RPS statutes, but a whole range of health and safety laws that are a traditional
62
province of state government.

P. Jacobs, Key Judge’s Take on Clean-Power Mandates Sparks Legal Debate, E&E NEWS (June 21, 2013),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059983289.
53.

See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).

54.
Id. at 1172. Colorado required 20% of the electricity sold in the state to come from renewable sources. Id. at 1170.
55.

Id. at 1173-74.

56.

Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1179 (D. Colo. 2014).

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

793 F.3d at 1170.

60.

Id. at 1171.

61.

Id. at 1173.

62.

See infra Section III.A.
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Roughly a year after EELI, a panel of the Eighth Circuit took a contrary posi63
tion on the extraterritoriality doctrine in North Dakota v. Heydinger (Heydinger).
North Dakota’s challenge here did not involve an RPS, but instead attacked the
64
constitutionality of Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA). Under
the NGEA, Minnesota barred in-state utilities from using electricity produced by a
“new large energy facility” that would contribute to “statewide power sector carbon
65
dioxide emissions.” In essence, the NGEA barred the importation or use of elec66
tricity from new fossil fuel driven power plants. While not an RPS, this statute
operates in a similar fashion by regulating the type of energy source an in-state
67
utility can rely on. As such, the court could have upheld the statute following the
same logic as the Tenth Circuit, relying on Judge Gorsuch’s opinion as persuasive
precedent. Judge Loken’s lead opinion seemed to acknowledge as much, suggesting
68
that under the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, Minnesota’s statute would likely survive.
Instead of following that persuasive precedent however, he struck down the rele69
vant NGEA provisions as an impermissible regulation of extraterritorial activity.
Part of the reason for this shift may be the new argument advanced by North
Dakota. North Dakota alleged that the NGEA improperly regulated transactions
70
between North Dakota utilities and other states, not just Minnesota. In contrast,
EELI argued that Colorado’s RPS influenced their businesses by restricting transactions between out-of-state power plants and Colorado in-state utilities, Judge
Loken found merit in North Dakota’s argument, focusing in particular on the un71
predictability of electron flows within the power grid. Since electrons do not follow a direct path from producer to utility to end user, the court agreed that any
energy producer selling electricity onto the regional power grid would, intentionally or not, send some of that power into Minnesota and be subject to potential ac72
tion under the NGEA. Minnesota, like Colorado, is part of a regional electric

63.

North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016).

64.

Id. at 915.

65.

Id. at 915-16.

66.
See Minn. Stat. § 216H.03, subd. 3(2) (2017) (quoted in 825 F.3d at 913) (later amended
after Heydinger case).
67.
See Tessa Gellerson, Note, Extraterritoriality and the Electric Grid: North Dakota v. Heydinger, A Case Study for State Energy Regulation, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 590-94 (2017) (analogizing
Minnesota’s NGEA to Hawaii’s 100% RPS mandate).
68.
See Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 920 (acknowledging the “somewhat contrary position” on extraterritoriality taken by Judge Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit opinion).
69.

Id. at 913-14.

70.
See id. at 916 (noting declarations by a North Dakota-based utility that they are “apprehensive” about entering into agreements to serve non-Minnesota load due to the NGEA).
71.

Id. at 921.

72.

Id.
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power grid that includes numerous other states.73 As such, many transactions on
74
the regional grid take place entirely outside of Minnesota. Because of that unpredictability the judge held that out-of-state power generators were justified in their
75
hesitation, and thus that the NGEA had an impermissible extraterritorial effect.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Loken took notice of and dismissed Judge
76
Gorsuch’s view of extraterritoriality. Rather than limiting the doctrine to cases of
price control statutes, he argued that, “the Supreme Court has never so limited the
77
doctrine, and indeed has applied it more broadly.” Judge Loken found that the
key question is not whether a statute explicitly regulates out-of-state conduct
through price controls, but more broadly whether, under Healy v. Beer Institute,
“the practical effect” of the law is to regulate conduct entirely beyond the bounda78
ries of the state.
If this view of extraterritoriality prevails before the Supreme Court, the effect
could be to strike down nearly every RPS in states across the country. Nearly eve79
ry state is part of a regional transmission grid that includes multiple other states.
Because the actual flow of electrons on the grid is unpredictable, as noted in Hey80
dinger, the only real way to ensure that a certain percentage of power consumed
in a specific state comes from renewable sources would be to mandate that the
same percentage of power across the full regional grid is produced by renewable
sources. Such an assurance would necessarily involve regulation of conduct occurring wholly outside the state, and thus would be subject to a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.

73.
Electric Power Markets: Midcontinent (MISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/midwest.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (map
showing regional power grid encompassing Minnesota along with several other states in the upper
Midwest).
74.

See Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 916.

75.

Id. at 922.

76.
Id. at 920 (“A panel of the Tenth Circuit recently took a somewhat contrary position . . .
The court ruled that non-price standards for products sold in-state may be amenable to commerce
clause scrutiny under the Pike balancing test.” (internal citations omitted)).
77.

Id.

78.

Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).

79.
Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp?csrt=3378524401904867453
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2018) (showing that the vast majority of regional transmission grids encompass several
states).
80.

825 F.3d at 924.
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The Second Circuit became the most recent appellate court to uphold a state
RPS in the face of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in the 2017 case Allco
Fin. Ltd. v. Klee (Allco). The challenge to Connecticut’s RPS took a somewhat different tack than either EELI or Heydinger, focusing on facial discrimination as op81
posed to extraterritoriality. Connecticut’s RPS allows utilities to meet its renewable energy requirement either through their own production of energy or through
82
the purchase of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). The challenge, brought by
renewable energy producers in Georgia and New York, focused on the structure of
the RECs.
Connecticut structured its RECs in such a way as to limit a utility’s use of out
of region generation to meet their mandated proportion of renewable energy. The
83
state legislature defined two tiers of RECs. The first could be generated only by
renewable energy sources located within the regional transmission grid ISO-NE,
which includes Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Is84
land, and part of Maine. The second could be generated by sources on adjacent
regional transmission grids and imported into the state pursuant to rules issued by
85
the New England Power Pool General Information System (NEPOOL-GIS). In
order for a REC from an adjacent transmission grid to count towards the RPS
however, the generator is required by NEPOOL-GIS rules to pay a fee to transmit
86
their power onto the ISO-NE grid that includes Connecticut. According to Allco
Finance, the owner of the relevant renewable power producers, this structure of
RECs excludes renewable energy produced throughout most of the country and
87
amounts to unconstitutional “regional protectionism.”
The Second Circuit rejected this argument. The court agreed with Connecticut that RECs are creations of state property law, and as such, Connecticut is free
88
to define them as it wishes. Because Connecticut defines a REC as a specific
product that only encompasses renewable generation from a particular region and
not from other regions, any REC produced in Georgia is a fundamentally different

81.

Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017).

82.
Id. at 86. A renewable energy credit is a “tradable commodity that represents a specific
amount of energy generated from a renewable resource.” Renewable Portfolio Standards, STATE POWER
PROJECT, https://statepowerproject.org/renewable-portfolio-standard/ (last visited June 16, 2019).
83.

861 F.3d at 93.

84.

Id.

85.
Id. NEPOOL-GIS “issues and tracks certificates for all MWh of generation and load produced in the ISO New England control area, as well as imported MWh from adjacent control areas.
NEPOOL GENERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM, https://www.nepoolgis.com/ (last visited June 16, 2019).
86.

861 F.3d at 94.

87.

Id. at 93.

88.

Id. at 103.
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product.89 Therefore, Connecticut’s program amounts to no more than “treat[ing]
90
different products differently in a nondiscriminatory fashion.” Because of this
determination, the panel found that any discrimination against out-of-state commerce was merely incidental, and therefore applied the more permissive Pike bal91
ancing test.
Under the Pike test, the court gave weight to Connecticut’s professed need for
92
its consumers to have a more diversified and renewable energy supply. They
found that, because Connecticut can only access such a supply if the electricity is
93
produced in a region where it can be transmitted into the state, its need can only
94
be met through this type of program. Given that local benefit, and the fact that
Connecticut has no option to change the boundaries of the electric grid to which it
has access, the court found this incidental discrimination permissible under the
95
dormant Commerce Clause. After analyzing the challenge posed by the Georgia
RECs, the panel quickly disposed of the challenge brought by the New York producers. The judges analogized the transmission fees charged to make New Yorkproduced RECs qualify for Connecticut’s program to a road toll, which “regularly
96
pass[es] constitutional muster.”
While Allco is the first case to uphold an RPS using this logic regarding
RECs, the Second Circuit found strong support for its holding in Supreme Court
precedent. The Court has stated that discrimination against an out-of-state, or in
this case out-of-region, product “assumes a comparison of substantially similar en97
tities.” In most scenarios, products that appear similar are in fact similar, but the
Court found that this is not always the case. Instead, “difference in products may
mean that the different entities serve different markets, and would continue to do
98
so even if the supposedly discriminatory burden were removed.” The Second
Circuit found that this was exactly the case with the Connecticut program. Although RECs produced in Georgia appear similar to those produced in New England, the regional structure of the electric grid meant that in practice, the credits
(and renewable energy) produced in Georgia and in Connecticut were isolated
from each other regardless of how Connecticut chose to structure its REC mar-

89.

Id. at 105.

90.

Id. at 103.

91.

Id.; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

92.

861 F.3d at 105.

93.
See id. at 106 (deciding that Connecticut could give preference to power generators that had
the ability to connect to their local grid).
94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 105.

96.

Id. at 108.

97.

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).

98.

Id. at 299.
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ket. 99 Because the products were considered dissimilar due to their isolation, the
court found that a state preference for one over the other was not facially discrimi100
natory.
The Second Circuit has been the only appellate court to date to consider the
claim that an RPS facially discriminates against interstate commerce. However, the
Ninth Circuit has addressed similar claims in relation to a California policy resem101
bling an RPS. In the 2013 case Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Corey), a
three-judge panel upheld California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) against a
constitutional challenge. The LCFS is distinct from California’s RPS. Rather than
mandating the use of renewable energy for electricity, the regulatory package seeks
102
to reduce the carbon intensity of transportation fuels used in the state. To do so,
the California Air Resources Board (CARB) developed a life cycle “carbon intensi103
ty rating” for each transportation fuel source used within the state. Based on this
determination of life cycle carbon emissions, which includes emissions that occur
during transport from the production location to point of use, the program gives
104
each fuel a carbon intensity score. By reducing the allowable average carbon intensity score for fuels used across the state, California incentivizes producers to
either alter their mix of transportation fuel in a less carbon-intensive direction, or
105
buy and sell credits to offset their most emissions-intensive fuels.
California’s LCFS is not an RPS, but the litigation over the LCFS is relevant
for analyzing the viability of some RPS lawsuits. Plaintiffs argued that the life cycle emissions analysis, in particular the fact that such analysis accounted for emissions that occur during transportation of fuel from the production site to the end
106
user, amounted to facial discrimination against out-of-state commerce. While no
RPS lawsuits have taken on this structure to date, the Ninth Circuit’s logic here
highlights another path going forward for states to promote environmental values
while capturing some economic benefit for themselves.
99.
See 861 F.3d at 104-05. (explaining the case’s connection to Tracy and noting that power
producers in Georgia serve a distinct market from those in the Northeast).
100.

Id. at 106-07.

101.

Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).

102.
CAL. AIR RES. BD., REGULATORY ADVISORY: LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD
SUPPLEMENTAL ADVISORY 10-04A 1 (July 2011), https://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/070111lcfs-repadv.pdf.
103.
See supra note 15 for a description of the life cycle emissions analysis. See also Kathryn Abbott, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause and California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 3 MICH. J. OF
ENVTL. & ADMIN. LAW 179, 185 (2013) for a more in-depth overview of California’s LCFS and the
constitutional challenge to it.
104.
See Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/
Fuels/Lcfs/Lcfs.htm.
105.
Debra Kahn, California to Extend Low-Carbon Fuel Standard Through 2030, SCI. AM.
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/california-to-extend-low-carbon-fuelstandard-through-2030/.
106.

Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1077.
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Corey contains two key holdings that are particularly relevant for both the
RPS policy discussion and future litigation over RPS laws. First, the Court held
that because California’s law does not simply draw a hard boundary at the state line
and raise the carbon intensity score for any fuel that crosses it, the LCFS did not
107
facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce. CARB did, for ease of administration, group fuel sources into three broad categories—fuels originating from
108
within California, from the Midwestern United States, and from Brazil. However, the court found this to be a reasonable distinction given the purpose of the pro109
gram. While not explicitly stated in the case, California’s ability to draw one
source region entirely in state may be due to their not receiving ethanol from
110
neighboring states. Rather than receiving ethanol from Nevada or Oregon, California received almost the entire remainder of its transportation fuel from the
111
corn-belt in the Midwest or from sugar producers in Brazil. Transportation from
those regions, unlike perhaps from neighboring states, could be thought to present
enough of a unique transportation challenge that they were justified in being
112
grouped and scored separately. In drawing this distinction, the court did note
113
that California “must treat ethanol from all sources evenhandedly.” However, it
concluded that the LCFS’ regional categories—including the region containing only in-state fuels—“show every sign that they were chosen to accurately measure
and control GHGs and were not an attempt to protect California ethanol produc114
ers.”
Because the panel found that California’s program did not facially discriminate, it applied the Pike balancing test to the incidental discrimination caused by
115
regional groupings. The court’s second key holding was that, under Pike, avoidance of climate change is a significant local benefit that offsets at least some of the
116
incidental protectionist impact of the LCFS. This conclusion largely relied on
117
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. There, the Su-

107.

Id. at 1097.

108.

Id. at 1093.

109.
Id. at 1094 (explaining that while fuels produced within California’s borders cannot all be
expected to have the same carbon intensity, the state does not need to create individualized scores for
every fuel from every source. Instead, for purposes of accounting for transportation emissions, CARB
may group fuels by region of origin, including one region drawn at the state line).
110.
Id. at 1096 (“There were no registered producers of corn ethanol from any state neighboring
California.”).
111.
Id. (noting that outside of one registered producer in Idaho, all ethanol producers that sold
to California were located either east of the Rocky Mountains or in Brazil).
112.

Id.

113.

Id. at 1094.

114.

Id. at 1097.

115.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

116.

See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1106-07.

117.

Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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preme Court found that expected future harm caused by climate change was
118
enough of an injury to grant a state standing to sue. The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that if future climate change is a sufficient injury to merit standing, avoidance of
that injury is a significant local interest for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause
119
balancing.
If the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on this issue is taken up by other courts, it
could have significant implications for the fate of RPS and other state climate initiatives. Even if an RPS incidentally places some burden on interstate commerce,
climate change avoidance would be considered a significant local benefit to counterbalance that burden. As such, any RPS that survives a challenge based on facial
discrimination or extraterritoriality, and is instead analyzed under Pike balancing, is
likely to be upheld.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
FUTURE DESIGN OF RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
This section explores the implications of the four primary cases discussed
above: EELI, Heydinger, Allco, and Corey. These cases are analyzed with regard to
future litigation consequences and implications for state legislative action. States
can create more room to pass aggressive renewable energy laws through careful
drafting of their statutes to shift courts’ focus away from the complexities of the
electric grid, and through consideration of how such statutes map onto the underlying structure of the national economy and congressional action. The section will
then examine the history and purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause to explore
how courts should analyze cases that arguably present questions of extraterritorial
impact or facial discrimination. Within each subsection, it will also consider ways
states might craft renewable energy programs in order to maintain positive environmental and economic effects while minimizing the danger of a constitutional
challenge.

A. Extraterritoriality
In EELI and Heydinger, the Tenth and Eighth Circuits advanced two distinct
views of the extraterritoriality doctrine. Under Judge Loken’s view on the Eighth
Circuit, a combination of the unpredictable flow of electrons on the multi-state
grid and the professed hesitance of out-of-state producers to enter into agreements

118.
See id. at 522-23 (“Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state’s
coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner. The severity of that
injury will only increase over the course of the next century.”) (internal citations omitted).
119.
See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1106 (comparing California’s interest in avoidance of climate change as comparable to that recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Massachusetts).
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to sell power onto the grid constitutes an impermissible extraterritorial effect. 120
While the statute at issue in Heydinger was not an RPS, adoption of this robust policing of extraterritorial effects would endanger virtually every state RPS in the
country. As I described above, nearly every state is part of a multi-state transmis121
sion grid, within which the actual flow of electricity is unpredictable. In Heydinger, the court could have avoided the particular holding it came to by assuming that
Minnesota’s statute restricted only contracts to import energy into the state, rather
122
than attempting to restrict actual flow of electrons into the state. The fact that it
did not accept such a view likely indicates that the court would view virtually all
state limitations on the energy market, including RPSs, as an impermissible infringement on entirely extraterritorial conduct.
The view of extraterritoriality set forth in Heydinger would not only endanger
RPS laws, but potentially any state health and safety regulation. In modern commercial practice, goods flow worldwide. One product may be designed in one location, have parts manufactured in another, warehoused in another, and be assembled
from parts built on supply chains that stretch around the world. Due to this complexity, the function of the global supply chain for a given product is little differ123
ent than the electric grid as the Eighth Circuit conceives it. Just as a unit of energy generated at a power plant in North Dakota could end up anywhere on the
regional transmission grid, a car part made in Texas could be shipped to an assembly line in Detroit before going to its final sales lot in California. The business relationship between the manufacturer and assembler would naturally be affected by
a new auto safety or emissions standard enacted in California. If the logic of Heydinger were applied to such a scenario, then California’s health or safety regulation
may be found to have an impermissible extraterritorial effect. Making these potential broader implications clear in future cases could be a key for states looking to
halt its adoption in other circuits.
Since the Lochner era, the courts have been wary of interpreting any portion of
the Constitution in a way that would significantly infringe on the core state func124
tion of health and safety regulation. Judge Loken’s view of extraterritoriality es-

120.

See supra Section II.A.

121.

Id.

122.
North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring
in part) (arguing that because electrons do not “flow” in the way the majority describes, a sounder reading of the statute would show that it applies only to bilateral contracts between Minnesota utilities and
out-of-state energy generators).
123.
To be sure, the analogy between the electric grid and a global supply chain is not perfect.
Unlike the path of a given unit of electrical charge on the grid, the path of one component in an automobile would be easily tracked from designer to manufacturer to assembly to final sale. However, the
point about extraterritorial effect would be the same, as a regulation in the state where a final sale takes
place could impact arrangements between entities in entirely different states in either case.
124.
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Since being overturned, dissenting
judges in a variety of cases have accused the majority of using a strained view of the Constitution to go
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poused in Heydinger would be a step toward Lochner, quashing state regulation and
125
innovation rather than allowing states to function as laboratories of democracy.
Given extraterritoriality’s potentially expansive and disruptive effect on a host of
state laws, it is unsurprising that there have been calls for the diminishment, or
126
even the discarding, of the doctrine.
The view adopted by then-Judge Gorsuch in EELI, under which extraterritoriality is a narrow doctrine that applies only to price control statutes, is a position
127
more in line with the goal of state flexibility. It provides states with the space to
pursue RPSs and other innovative policies to push the development of renewable
energy, along with maintaining the states’ traditional authority over a broad scope
of health and safety regulation. Justice Gorsuch’s elevation to the Supreme Court
indicates that this narrow view of extraterritoriality, and possibly a narrow view of
the dormant Commerce Clause more generally, could be taking hold on the highest
court in the land.
Should the expansive extraterritoriality doctrine advanced in Heydinger gain
steam across the judiciary though, there may be some steps a state legislature could
take to bolster its RPS against constitutional attack. In Heydinger itself, a portion of
the court’s reasoning appeared to rely on a misguided assumption about how electricity moves on the grid, and how the statute could realistically be enforced. In
Heydinger, Judge Loken’s lead opinion argued that the statutory command that “no
person” shall “import or commit to import” meant that Minnesota intended to
regulate not only the “contract path” of energy—the agreement between buyer and
seller—but each individual electron that happened to make its way onto the state’s
128
portion of the grid. A concurring judge did note the practical impossibilities of
tracking one specific unit of energy from an individual producer to an end consum129
er. However, complexities of the grid combined with unclear statutory language

back to the Lochner era. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority’s approach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled
tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner.”); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The resemblance of today’s state sovereign
immunity to the Lochner era’s industrial due process is striking . . . I expect the Court’s late essay into
immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and probably as fleeting.”).
125.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.).
126.
See Brandon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal
Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 1006 (2013); Tessa Gellerson, Note, Extraterritoriality and the Electric
Grid: North Dakota v. Heydinger, A Case Study for State Energy Regulation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563
(2017).
127.

See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015).

128.

North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2016).

129.

Id. at 92425 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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may have nudged Judge Loken toward a more expansive reading of extraterritorial130
ity than he otherwise would have taken.
To bolster their statutes, states may be advised to explicitly focus only on the
financial transaction in power markets. This could be easily done by dropping the
“import or commit to import” language from Minnesota’s NGEA. A legislature
could sub in language barring any person from “entering into a contract to import”
fossil fuel energy or, in the case of an RPS, more than a certain percentage of their
energy from non-renewable sources. This would not necessarily dispose of any
constitutional attack. A court determined to take a strong view of extraterritoriality, as described above, could still strike it down. By forcing a court to focus on specific transactions rather than the complex working of the electric grid though, a
legislature would push the court to either uphold their statute or take a much more
131
explicitly expansive view of extraterritoriality. Given the strength of traditional
132
state authority over general public health and welfare regulations, courts may be
unwilling to so expand the doctrine. By forcing the court to choose between a permissive attitude towards state regulation or a more explicitly Lochnerian view of
the dormant Commerce Clause, states may be able to more aggressively pursue
RPSs and similar clean energy legislation.

B. Facial Discrimination
The Ninth and Second Circuits, in the Corey and Allco cases, respectively, addressed challenges to state environmental legislation that alleged facial discrimination. In both cases, the plaintiffs appeared to have strong cases. In Corey, California’s LCFS explicitly created three groups of fuels based on origin, one of which
133
included only those ethanol sources within the state. In Allco, the Connecticut
provision at issue allowed only RECs from within a specified region to count to134
wards fulfillment of a utility’s obligation under the RPS. In both cases however,
the courts agreed with the state that the seemingly protectionist lines were in fact
consistent with the overall purpose of the statute, and thus did not constitute facial
135
discrimination.
These cases each strike a balance; they remain consistent with the purpose of
the dormant Commerce Clause while maintaining states’ ability to experiment
130.
See id. (suggesting that Judge Loken’s primary opinion in the case misunderstood the complexities of the grid, leading him to read the import provision of the statute in a way that is “absurd,
impossible of execution, or unreasonable”).
131.
See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential consequences
of this broader view of extraterritoriality.
132.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014) (“The States have broad authority
to enact legislation for the public good—what we have often called a ‘police power.’”).
133.

Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1094 (9th Cir. 2013).

134.

Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2017).

135.

Supra Section II.B.
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within our federal system of governance. The dormant Commerce Clause is not
explicit within the text of the Constitution. It operates on the theory that while the
founders wanted to maintain the core powers of the states, they were also con136
cerned about the dangers of a fragmented national economy. In the years prior
to the enactment of the Constitution, James Madison specifically called out “the
practice of many States in restricting the commercial intercourse with other States,
and putting their productions and manufactures on the same footing with those of
137
foreign nations.” Our economy today is far more interconnected, both among
states and among nations, than it was in the late 1700s. As such, it is even more
important today for the courts to find ways to police protectionist activity while
maintaining the states’ ability to regulate in their core fields of public health and
safety.
In Allco, the court recognized that the state alone was not responsible for the
arguably protectionist boundaries it had drawn. While the Connecticut RPS only
allowed RECs from within its regional transmission grid or a directly adjacent
grid, the court reasoned that the primary purpose for this was not discriminatory,
but was in response to FERC’s decision at the federal level to design and support
138
regional transmission grids. This view of the dormant Commerce Clause, in
which state regulations that have some discriminatory impact—and arguably even
facial discrimination—are judged with the underlying federal system in mind, is
the most consistent with the purposes of the doctrine. The dormant Commerce
Clause is a background presumption that operates in the absence of Congressional
139
action. Through FERC, Congress has granted its approval to the regional
transmission grid that makes it virtually impossible for Connecticut to receive en140
ergy generated on the other side of the country. The court correctly read this
136.
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1890 (2011) (“Many people in the [founding]
period, including but not limited to some of the most influential Framers, believed interstate discrimination to be an extremely serious problem meriting a profound response.”).
137.
Id. at 1885 (quoting James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in
James Madison: Writings 69, 70-71 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999)).
138.
861 F.3d at 107 (“Significantly, we note that Connecticut’s RPS program makes geographic
distinctions between RECs only insofar as it piggybacks on top of geographic lines drawn by ISO-NE
and the NEPOOL-GIS, both of which are supervised by FERC—not the state of Connecticut.”).
139.
See, e.g., Friedman & Deacon, supra note 136, at 1897 (describing dormant Commerce
Clause questions as those that arise in cases where Congress has not moved to either approve or bar the
state action).
140.
861 F.3d at 105 (“Connecticut consumers’ need for a more diversified and renewable energy
supply, accessible to them directly through their regional grid or indirectly through adjacent control
areas, would not be served by RECs produced by Allco’s facility in Georgia—which is unable to transmit its electricity into ISO-NE.”); see also David C. Wagman, It’s Time to Tie the U.S. Electric Grid Together, Says NREL Study, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 8, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/
energy/the-smarter-grid/after-almost-100-years-of-talk-time-might-be-right-to-strengthen-theinterconnect (“The U.S. electrical grid is really made up of three largely separate grids with puny
transmission connections at the seams.”).
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action by the federal government to set up a fragmented energy system as blessing
141
the development of state level energy regulations that track those regional lines.
Although California did not map its LCFS regions onto preexisting, federally
approved lines, the Ninth Circuit correctly held in Corey that the distinction did
142
not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce. To arrive at that conclusion, the court rejected a rigidly formalistic approach to application of the doctrine,
143
and instead ruled with its purpose in mind. The dormant Commerce Clause is
designed to prevent states from erecting artificial barriers for the purpose of pro144
tecting interstate commerce from competition. While California did create one
ethanol source region entirely within the state, that distinction fell squarely within
145
the purpose of the LCFS rather than for some extraneous protectionist purpose.
Rather than being principally motivated by economic protectionism, California
was primarily attempting to force fuel producers to pay for the externalities of fuel
production that are not adequately captured in the bare cost of the fuel – namely,
the environmental cost that climate change will inflict on California and its citi146
zens. That core justification suggests that the state had primarily non-protective
reasons for their action, and thus that the LCFS should not be subject to the virtually per se bar that comes with a finding of facial discrimination. Recognizing that
any potential discriminatory impact of the LCFS was tangential to the primary
purpose of the law, the court properly analyzed it under the Pike balancing frame147
work.
The dormant Commerce Clause analyses in Allco and Corey provide important
signposts for states hoping to enact an RPS or bolster it against constitutional challenge. A state can capture some of the economic benefits of renewable energy de-

141.
See id. at 106 (“The RPS program’s definition of qualifying RECs appears to be a response
to, rather than a cause of, the fact that Connecticut has direct access only to electricity on the ISO-NE
grid, and indirect access only to electricity imported from adjacent control areas.”); see also Felix Mormann, Market Segmentation vs. Subsidization: Clean Energy Credits and the Commerce Clause’s Economic
Wisdom, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1854, 1872-73 (2018) (making the case that even if the Second Circuit’s
treatment of state property law under the dormant Commerce Clause was incorrect, the court was on
stronger footing in its argument that FERC had segregated the energy market such that Connecticut
could not receive energy from Georgia).
142.

Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).

143.
See id. (criticizing plaintiff’s reliance on “archaic formalism” in their attempt to strike down
California’s law using the dormant Commerce Clause).
144.
See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986).
145.

See supra Section II.B.

146.
See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
321, 371-73 (2016) (exploring how identification of policy solutions to address externalities can lead to
political breakthroughs in fields as such as climate change and vaccination).
147.
See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1105-06 (recognizing that while California’s
LCFS did have differential effects across state lines, this was merely incidental to the state’s policy decision to “pay for environmental protection”).
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velopment, as long as its statutes have a primary purpose unrelated to economic
protectionism. The two cases present contrasting ways states may be able to capture this benefit.
First, under the Allco analysis, if a state can point to a preexisting federal law
that is outside its control and serves to segment the market, it can validly claim
that a law tracking that dividing line is not protectionist. The clearest way to do
this is outlined in Allco, where the state REC boundaries tracked the federally supported regional transmission grid.
Second, as California did with its LCFS, a state might validly link a distancebased distinction to the primary purpose of the law. There, transporting ethanol
over great distances increased overall emissions, so a fee could be charged to account for those emissions. The fact that with minimal exceptions, ethanol sold in
California was produced either in state, in the Midwest, or in Brazil was a background national condition that also likely bolstered the law against an attack on
148
dormant Commerce Clause grounds. In the case of an RPS, a state’s primary
purpose for passing the law is likely some combination of avoiding climate change
and bolstering the reliability and diversity of generation sources on the electric
149
grid. The state may validly be able to argue that avoided emissions or increased
reliability brought about by rooftop solar and other localized projects are consistent
150
with that purpose. If that case is adequately made, a state could argue that under
Corey, modestly favoring local projects is not protectionist, but is a natural consequence of the statute’s purpose. At that point the statute would be analyzed under
the more permissive Pike balancing test.

CONCLUSION
In the coming decades, state level innovations such as RPSs will likely be a
key driver of U.S. environmental and energy policy. This Note has highlighted the
ways in which the dormant Commerce Clause could serve as a stumbling block for
these laws. An expansive reading of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine not only
bodes ill for state environmental laws, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the
Clause to balance promotion of a unified national economy with allowance of sufficient space for state experimentation. This Note argues for a slightly narrower
view of the dormant Commerce Clause, and of the extraterritoriality doctrine in
particular. It also highlights a few key steps states can take to bolster their policies
against constitutional attacks. Without significantly fragmenting the national

148.

See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.

149.
State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, supra note 19 (RPS “can play an integral role in
state efforts to diversify their energy mix, promote economic development and reduce emissions.”).
150.
Peter Fairley, How Rooftop Solar Can Stabilize the Grid, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 21, 2015),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/solar/how-rooftop-solar-can-stabilize-the-grid.
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economy, these small shifts would clear the way for continued state innovation to
drive our nation forward into a green energy future.

